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INFORMALITY AND I LLEGALITY: 
TH E CASE OF COCA PRODUCTION IN BOLIVIA 
Roberto Laserna 
Introduction 
This essay examines the relationship between infonnality and illegality, par­
ticularly as addressed from a policy-oriented perspective. It suggests some 
criteria for differentiating informality from illegality and, to i llustrate the basic 
model, it considers a case in which this relationship is currently being con­
fronted: the production of coca in Bolivia. 
Informality and Illegality 
In a strict sense, there is no difference between informality and illegality. In  
fact, if there is  any agreement among those working on the infonnal sector, it 
is that the feature that unifies such a wide variety of activities is that they take 
place outside the institutional boundaries, regulations, and controls of the state. 
That means they are illegal; they do not comply with the laws established in 
the legal system. 
The legal system is, however, a social product that requires not only a stan­
dard set of rules and sanctions to prescribe individual and collective behavior, 
but also a controlling authority with the political and the material capability to 
enforce them. In this sense, the most influential figures of modem social 
thought, Karl Marx ( 1 975, 1 978), Max Weber (1 947), and Emile Durkheim 
(1 960), would agree that legality is an outcome of the interplay of social forces. 
Although all forms of social organization develop processes of social control, 
these processes develop over time according to changes that affect the group 
as a whole and to changes within the group. One of the most significant 
changes in this regard, observable when societies became literate and more 
complex, is the formalization of their systems of social control. Customs 
become legal nonns, sanctions are standardized, and functions of control and 
authority are delegated to specialized corps. In this process, it is conceivable 
to find historical periods in which disparities exist between the legal system 
and the realities of social life - i.e., situations in which novelty confronts what 
has been previously established. From the perspective of the authorities, new 
patterns of behavior, new products, new modes of action, new technologies, 
new social or economic actors, may all pose a threat to the viability of the 
legal system. But the social acceptance of the newness will tend to provoke 
adjustment of the law while providing some tolerance and even protection to 
those caught in the lag between existing legality and emerging reality. 
That is certainly the case with most informal activities. They have social 
acceptance - are tolerated by the society as a whole - and the coercive apparat­
us, the state, finds itself functioning in an ambiguous shadow. Such ambiguity, 
although eroding the political legitimacy of the state, often provides govern­
ments and bureaucracies with an arbitrary power. It is a considerable but 
unstable power, built through networks of clientelism and patronage that 
replace obsolete or nonexisting legal and institutional channels between the 
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state and society. In this sense, the notion of infonnality reveals more about 
the state and the institutional system than about the activities to which it refers. 
Thus, when large "sectors" of the society become "infonnal," the legal system 
is In the process of fonnation or adjustment to an emerging reality. A historical 
perspective reveals that law, the result of social processes, often generated 
conflict and dispute. Thus, infonnality and illegality are not synonymous. The 
legal system has simply not caught up with the infonnal sector. 
In this regard, a scheme can be developed to differentiate between informal 
and other "illegal" activities. Considering the legal status of labor and produc­
tion processes on the one hand, and the final product on the other, four cate­
gories of economic activity can be distinguished (see Table 1 below): 
FI NAL 
Table 1 
Differentiated Status of Activities Based Upon Final Product, 
and Labor and Production Processes 
LABOR AND PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Reculated Unreculated 
Lecal Formal Informal 
PRODUCT 
l l lecal Off-the-books Underground 
(a) Formal and legal activity. This is characterized by a regulated process of 
production of a legal product, enjoying, therefore, the impersonal protection 
offered by the legal system and its controlling authority. 
(b) Informal activity. Its main characteristics are the institutionally unregu­
lated nature of its productive organization and, at the same time, the open 
relationship maintained with the users and consumers of the final product due 
to its legal status. 
(c) "Off-the-books" activity. This includes those activities of legally constitu­
ted enterprises that are hidden to avoid the institutional control, regulation, or 
sanction of the state. The final product, whether an undeclared service or an 
untaxed, illicit profit, is considered illegal. 
(d) Underground activity. These are illegal activities that take place beyond 
the institutional scope of the legal system both in tenns of the productive organi­
zation and in tenns of the final product. We reserve the tenn underground for 
this group because even the relationship between the producer and the con­
sumer or user of the final product must be hidden to avoid sanctions and penal­
ties against one or the other. 
From the previous discussion it is clear that we consider neither the fonnalf 
infonnal nor the open/underground distinction as fiXed or absolute. To the 
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contrary, they are subject to change from time to time and from place to place, 
reflecting the political, legal, and economic changes in a given society. 
Finally, we should note that our discussion has been based on an abstract 
society whose instibJtional and legal system emerges from its own historical 
process and from the interplay of its internal social forces. In the actual world 
the situation becomes much more complicated, as can clearly be seen in the 
Third World. Post-colonial states inherit bureaucracies, political elites attempt 
to build new legal frameworl<s, and international institutions impose external 
goals and criteria. If these forces were not enough to create ambiguity, urban 
migration, industrial modernization, and cultural changes also contribute to the 
development of new social structures. The existence of infonnal and under­
ground activities is a measure of the lags between the state, in its broadest 
sense, and society. 
A Case of Blurring Boundaries: Coca Production in Bolivia 
In the case of Bolivian coca production, we can find an interesting illustration 
of this discussion. for most of the Andean workers used to chewing coca, they 
are the "sacred leaves. • They were a gift of Inti, as some say, or perhaps were 
found by the Virgin when the Sacred family was escaping to Egypt, as others 
say, but, in any case, they are a god's gift. Closer than the legend, they can feel 
the tonic rewards of the bulge in their cheek, not only when the day is long or 
the work is hard, but also when communication must be established with their 
peers or beyond.1 With effects similar to those of other mild stimulants such 
as tea or coffee, coca chewing is deeply embedded in the daily life of the major­
ity of the Bolivian population. Because it has many more functions, from indi­
vidual stimulation to social lubricant, from medicinal herb to magical properties 
in foreseeing the future, from practical uses to symbolic ones, coca is in many 
respects a symbol of ethnic identity. That may be also the source of some of 
its problems. 
The native population in Bolivia has been subjugated during long periods, 
and we well know that the dominator attempts to justify his domination by 
claiming his biological or cultural superiority. Denigrating the people below is 
part of his game. In such a framework, prejudices about native cultures and 
their products reinforce each other. 
In the early days of Bolivian history, the contempt of the dominant oligarchy 
for the native population was overshadowed by the profitability of coca in the 
market. 2 Despite the inclusion of coca and cocaine as addictive drugs in the 
protocols of the Hague Convention of 1 912, and the classification of cocaine 
as a dangerous drug in the first Federal antidrug law passed in the United States 
in 1 91 4, coca cultivation was one of the main activities in the lowlands of La Paz 
and no serious attempt was made to curb or control its production. 
In 1 952, a popular insurrection started a profound process of change that 
included a radical agrarian reform in the rural areas of the country (Malloy 1 970). 
The land of the agricultural oligarchy was expropriated and native peasants 
took over, dividing the lands into small family plots. Land shortage, and the 
desire to diversify the economy and to expand the agricultural frontier, led the 
government to promote rural-rural migrations to the tropical areas of Santa 
Cruz and Cochabamba, in eastern Bolivia. 
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The promotion consisted of opening roads and making promises, but it 
was nevertheless effective. By 1980, 300,000 people had moved to "colonize 
the tropics"; this represented almost 20 percent of the peasant population 
(Bianes 1983, Blanes and Flores 1983). For those migrants, everything was 
new and adverse: a hot and humid climate, another diet, unknown insects 
and illnesses, and different soils and produce for which their cultivation 
techniques and farming experiences were almost worthless. They missed 
their communities, their mountains, and their potatoes. But they were there, 
with land and the need to produce. They did so. They began to supply rice, 
com, oranges, avocados, bananas, and coca. 
Indeed, coca cultivation was at the core of this process. Typically, after 
clearing the forest and preparing the land, the "colonist" grew rice to feed his 
family and to repay favors. In a second stage, he diversified his farm with yucca, 
banana, and coca, and began to raise chickens and pigs. After two years, the 
farm would begin to stabilize with the regular crop of coca leaves. Since coca 
is not a seasonal plant, when sown in small parcels at different times through­
out the year, coca allowed the peasant to obtain a stable weekly crop that was 
easy to sell in the marketplace. The plants proved resistant to plagues and 
insects and thus may provide three to four crops a year over thirteen years. 
With a regular cash flow and a highly valued product to exchange for labor 
and other staples from relatives in the highlands, the "colonist" was able to 
improve the situation of his family and his own status (Henkel 1 971,  Xavier 
1 976, Blanes 1983 and 1 985). In a sense, due to its symbolic value and the 
economic security that it provided, coca is for the "colonist" farmer what land 
is to the peasant. In fact, the colonist does not have the attachment to land so 
typical among traditional peasants. The forest - from his perception - pro­
vides land almost without limit, but it is a savage land he cannot trust. Coca, 
on the contrary, represents for him the benign side of the hostile jungle. 3 But 
the cultivation was no longer under the control of the ruling classes, and inter­
national interests had found a more open channel to the coca market. 
Professor Troy Duster, of the Institute of the Study of Social Problems of the 
University of California at Berkeley, believes that even though drugs are an 
aspect of social life everywhere, they are banned and repressed not for their 
pharmacological effects or their potential harm, but because their consumption 
intersects with other symbolic areas in which people have strong feelings. 
When Chinese labor was not needed any more, the war on opium was used 
to justify its exclusion. A similar pattern can be observed when cocaine was 
associated with blacks and, later on, marijuana with Mexicans. Drug wars, 
suggests Duster, are basically a means to disenfranchise segments of the 
lower classes. 4 
"Drug scares have never been merely about drug problems, serious though 
they are, • levine and Reinarman ( 1 988) similarly write. ''They are about blaming 
drugs for all sorts of problems people fear and fret over but cannot do much 
about without disturbing the underlying structural features of our society that 
give rise to them. • For these authors, it is not surprising that the Reagan Admin­
istration made the 'cocaine invasion' the focus of so much rhetoric, because 
the administration needed a scapegoat for the social and economic repression 
of its eight years of economic restructuring. 5 
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This convergence of factors illustrates the dilemmas and problems posed by 
the question about illegality and informality. If we apply our proposed scheme 
of differentiation to the Bolivian case of the production of coca and its related 
effects, we find the situation shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Institutional and Legal Status of the Coca-Cocaine Complex 
LABOR AND PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Re�lated Unre""lated 
Leeal (formal) (Informal) 
Import trade Coca production 
Construction Input supplies 
Local I ndustry Agric. food 
Transportation 
FINAL 
PRODUCT 
ll leeal (Off-the-books) (Undewound) 
Money- Cocaine 
laundering production/ 
Bribes distribution 
Contraband 
Coca production is currently an informal activity, and of great importance, 
as shown above. But the illegal nature of cocaine, the most important of coca's 
final products, and the pressure of the American government on the Bolivian 
legal system, could tum it into an underground activity and transform 60,000 
farmers into criminals. Coca producers are certainly concerned about the 
implications of their activity, but they feel that the problem is not theirs. I 
once asked a coca-leaf producer if he did not care about youngsters dying in 
solitude of overdoses of cocaine. "Yes I care, • he said, "but I blame those who 
do not care about their solitude. • Then he added, "I would rather be picking 
up oranges, but you can see, my oranges are rotting in the trees. • 
I llegality, however, is not the main problem. The market value of Bolivian 
cocaine has been estimated at $40 to $80 billion when sold in the American 
streets6 but the amount in peasants' hands is less than 100 million (Medina 1 986). Nevertheless, the impact on the Bolivian economy has been enormous, 
and the cim�lation of the money has provided for the expansion of the market 
in which other activities can expand. Contraband, money-laundering, bribery, 
corruption, and all sorts of speculative activities are creating not only economic 
opportunities but also a kind of social schizophrenia. The national economy 
found itself linked through drug trafficking to the new international economy;! whose "mystique" of competition and consumption organizes the entire world. 
This is a process, however, that comes at a high cost. Although the transition 
128 
Informality and Illegality, Laserna 
to democracy has enhanced the representativeness and therefore the political 
power of the state, the economic crisis, and the expansion of the underground 
economy have eroded its capabilities to the limit of impotence. Squeezed by 
external debt requirements, and unable to transfer the burden toward the 
dynamic sector that most benefitted in the past, the state has been extracting 
resources from the fonnal sector (its tax base). Therefore, the adjustment 
process weakens even more an already frail official economy (including the 
public sector), even at the risk of destr�ng it, and increases the relative 
importance of the underground economy.8 
From another perspective in Bolivian society, the drug connection repre­
sents the strongest force behind capitalist development, so strongly advocated 
by developmentalist governments of the recent past. By expanding the mar­
ket, this force is defining new patterns of consumption and opening new chan­
nels of social mobility. Through them, it is legitimizing the basic cultural bases 
of the capitalist economy, with its individualistic, profit-oriented economic 
rationality. Yet, the drug trade is both stigmatized and stigmatizing activities 
that elsewhere would be perfectly legal. 
Conclusions 
Acknowledging the relationship between informality and illegality is clearly 
important to the future of countries such as Bolivia. Unfortunately, there do 
not seem to be clear-cut means of doing so. This could only come as the result 
of an open debate in which the political and economic stands could be explicitly 
considered instead of being left to short-run passions. At stake are the fates of 
many people whose lives (and deaths) evolve along the moving boundaries of 
informality and illegality. 
[Editor's note: The assessment of the political situation in Bolivia 
has not been updated to 1992. The situation described here is 
current as of when this paper was written in 1990./ 
NOTES 
1 There are several studies about legends, traditions, and functions of coca leaves and 
coca-chewing in the Andean societies. See, for instance, Carter and Mamani, 1 978 
and 1 980. 
2ay 1 860, German chemists isolated one of the stimulant elements in coca leaves, and 
pretty soon the magic of cocaine was applauded by notables such as Pope Leo XIII and 
Sigmund Freud. See Ashley, 1 976. 
3see Ray Henkel, "The Chapare of Bolivia: a study of tropical agriculture in transition, • 
Ph.D. Dissertation in Geography, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1 971 ; Albo Xavier, 
"Coripata: Tierra y cocales", CIPCA, La Paz, 1 976; Blanes jose, op. cit., and "Migra­
ciones, colonizacion y narcotrafico en Bolivia. Requiem para Ia insercion de Ia 
Amazonia a Ia economia nacional"; paper submitted to the Seminar on Amazonian 
Problems, Lima, May 1 985. 
4Presentation at the Conference on "Legalization of I llicit Drugs"; School of Public 
Health, Department of Sociology, Institute for the Study of Social Problems and Exten­
sion Division of the University of California, Berkeley, 1 8-1 9 March 1 989 (personal 
notes). In his presentation, Prof. Duster claimed that, as drug consumption is a cultural 
feature, different groups tend to use different drugs, and their legalization responds to 
the relative power of the group in the society. The obvious comparison are the fate of 
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those two dangerous addictive drugs whose producers enjoy so much economic and 
political power: alcohol and tobacco. 
5The relative harm of illegal drugs has been evaluated by the Surgeon General in his 
Report on Tobacco. It is estimated that while tobacco is directly associated with 
350,000 deaths annually in the United States, and alcohol with 100,000, all the illegal 
drugs combined kill each year between 5,000 and 6,000 people. Quoted in ABC 
News, September 1 3, 1 988, "The Koppel Report. • 
61n this book, Medina, whose objective is to develop a macroeconomic perspective of 
the problem, estimates almost 6 billion dollars in capital flight from Bolivia between 
1 980 and 1 985 from financial flows related to cocaine. This capital, as well as that 
generated in the upper levels of this illegal market, receive privileged treatment in the 
banks, as was revealed during the Kerry Hearings in April 1 987. 
7 For a broader discussion of this issue see Manuel Caste lis and Roberto Laserna, "The 
New Dependency. Technological Change and Socio-Economic Restructuring in Latin 
America, • Berkeley, 1 989 (forthcoming). 
Bin order to reduce the public budget, the current democratic government has been 
reducing its large bureaucracy and closing public enterprises. With the tin market 
crash and the shrinkage of commodity prices, most mines became unprofitable and 
were closed. It is estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of the labor force in the 
mining sector lost jobs between 1 986 and 1988. Some of them formed collectives to 
work old mines, assuming horrendous conditions of labor; others received retirement 
benefits and moved to small trade in cities; and some of them went to dare the jungle 
and produce coca The situation of those former mineworkers is not much different 
from the situation of the Bolivian government itself. On the one hand, it acknowledges 
the harshness of the international transformation and the overwhelming technological 
gap that is going to delay and postpone even more the national development, but it has 
been unable to shift its focus away from the financial burden. Within its limited capa­
bilities, there is no room for concerns other than the debt, in the belief that paying the 
debt under renegotiated terms will imply the permanence of Bolivia in the international 
system and, thus, a share in the brighter world of the 21st century. For such a project 
it is required to repress and to combat drug trafficking. at least with the rigor and effi­
ciency used in the consumer countries. However, on the other hand, it is trying to 
"formalize" capital accumulated in the underground economy, sti'>:'Uiating investments 
in the besieged formal sector, while tolerating their operations since the underground 
economy is also the main source of hard currency and the only sector that seems able 
to absorb the increasing mass of unemployed. 
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